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Abstract. India’s aspiration to a ‘rising power’ status, particularly in the post Cold 
War period, particularly her increasing global engagement and responsibilities continues to 
be largely dependent upon the level of her engagement in the strategically vital neighbouring 
region of South Asia, which in turn, continues to be influenced by historical legacy and intra-
regional linkages. In spite of being the major regional player, Indian policy making in South 
Asia has continued to be rather static and conservative due to a large number of factors. 
Since such policymaking has failed to ensure a greater degree of regional stability, certain 
alternatives could be adopted to change regional status-quo. 
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Introduction
Like any other policy making, the foreign policy making process is inherently a 
dynamic one determined by a number of factors. India’s aspiration to a ‘rising power’ 
status, particularly in the post Cold War period, has not been an exception to this trend. 
As some analysts have argued that acting under cross-pressure, India’s foreign policy 
appears to vacillate between appeasement and aggression, rather than converging 
onto the assertion of national self-interest1. Another scholar had gone to the extent of 
characterising India as a ‘proto-imperialist’ power, which, because of its pervasive 
influence in its neighbourhood in South Asia, has acquired the status of ‘second tier 
imperialist’ power.2 Though these are somewhat extreme views, it has to be admitted 
that while India has been a mildly revisionist state at the level of the international system, 
its regional agenda for the past several decades has been to buttress the regional status 
quo for the simple reason that the current configuration of regional capabilities suits it.3
India’s status as a ‘rising power’ has led it to reorient and reformulate its relations 
with the global powers. This has been particularly so since the end of the Cold War and 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union which continued to be the most important strategic 
partner of India since the signing of the bilateral treaty in 1971 till its collapse in 1991. 
Two major aspects of ‘rising India’ have been India’s economic growth since the onset of 
the liberalization process since 1991 and its expanding military links. India’s economic 
growth has also been part of the success story in enhancing India’s global reach. Since 
the onset of the liberalisation process, the economic growth has been more or less steady 
helping in integrating India within the global economy. For long India has championed 
the demands of the developing and underdeveloped countries and had projected the 
interests and aspirations of the global South in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
negotiations. The global recession and its severe impact upon the US and European 
economies in recent years have also enhanced the economic clout of Asian economies 
like China, and to an extent, India in this respect. The clearest indication of this was the 
replacement of the G8 by G20 which included developing countries like India.
Another indicator of India’s rise is the expanding horizon and outlook of the Indian 
defence forces. There is a conscious attempt to reduce the old dependence on Soviet/
Russian military hardware and armaments and diversify India’s purchase of defence 
equipments and hardware. Apart from the US, defence firms from the European countries 
and Israel are emerging as important suppliers to the Indian defence sector. Collaborative 
ventures, research and joint exercises are more frequent and diversified than in previous 
decades. Of particular importance is the expanding horizon of the Indian navy which is 
1 Mitra, S. K.; Schöttli, J. The New Dynamics of Indian Foreign Policy and Its Ambiguities. Irish Studies in 
International Affairs. 2007, 18: 21.
2 Dutt, S. India and the Third World: Altruism or Hegemony? London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 13.
3 Sahni, V. The Protean Polis and Strategic Surprises: Do Changes within India affect South Asian Strategic 
Stability? Contemporary South Asia. 2005, 14(2): 219.
Societal Studies. 2012, 4(2): 407–425. 409
fast developing into a major force in the Indian Ocean region and even beyond. Regular 
naval exercises held with the US navy and the navies of the Southeast and East Asian 
countries have taken the Indian navy beyond the shores of India. The Indian navy is also 
engaged, unilaterally, or in partnership with other navies, in counter-terrorism activities; 
anti-piracy missions and also humanitarian exercises. The Indian navy is in the process 
of transforming its brown-water/green-water navy into a blue water navy.
The evidence from the late twentieth century, however, suggests that the regional 
space is becoming increasingly important in power transition and power projection 
capacity for any developed or developing power. In, other words, an emerging power 
like India is unlikely to emerge as a systemic player at the global level without first 
consolidating and pacifying its own region through a process of positive transformation, 
into a zone of growth and peace. This makes it relevant to properly analyse the impact 
of India’s policy making in the South Asian region4. 
1. South Asian Regional Dynamics
A combination of historical problems along with the painful experiences associated 
with the partition and decolonisation of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 vitiated the 
prospects for effective regionalism during the early decades in the post colonial period. 
Moreover, the South Asian countries were also busy with the task of nation building, 
which was (and continues to be) a difficult task given the existing state-society gap in 
all South Asian countries making violence the primary characteristic determining state-
society relations in the region. The linkages between the South Asian countries with the 
West, determined by the ‘centre-periphery’ paradigm during colonial period was again 
reinforced substantially through dependency on the North for credit and technology 
transfers. There was, thus, little scope for a vigorous regional economic interaction.
The South Asian region is also an ‘Indo-centric’ region because of the strategic 
location of India straddling the region, her geographical size and extent, her vast 
population and her superiority in terms of military, economic and soft power. But this 
has not resulted in unambiguous acceptance of her ‘hegemony’ on the part of the South 
Asian countries. In fact, the projection and exercising of Indian hegemony in the region 
has been a complex and evolving affair, not uniform in character and often contested. 
India’s South Asian neighbours have continuously sought to deny or negate this 
preeminence by seeking to limit India’s regional hegemony. This has resulted in regional 
rivalry and tension expressed through steady rise in military expenditure and defence 
spending, including the overt nuclearisation of the regional rivals, India and Pakistan. 
4  Rajagopalan, R.; Sahni, V. India and the Great Powers: Strategic Imperatives, Normative Necessities. 
South Asian Survey. 2008, 15(5): 7. 
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The region in this sense could be also characterised as a ‘security complex’ constituting 
a subsystem of the global community of states that for reasons related to historical, geo-
strategic and socio-cultural linkages have an interlinked security architecture. 
Table 1. South Asia: Basic Characteristics5
Country Territory
(sq km)
Popula-
tion
 (2010)
(in  
million)
Gross 
National 
Income(GNI) 
per capita  
(PPP 2008 $)
Selected  
human  
development 
indicators
Life  
Expectancy  
at birth(yrs)
(2010)
Adult literacy 
Rate(% age 15 
yrs and older)
(2006-2007)
Infant  
mortality rate
(per 1000  
live births)
(2007)
Afghanistan 652,230 26.01 1419 44.6 28.1 149.2
Bangladesh 143,998 146.06 1587 66.9 53.0 39
Bhutan 38,394 0.70 5607 66.8 54.0 14
India 3,287,263 1182.11 3337 64.4 66.0 44
Maldives 298 0.32 5408 72.3 97.0 26
Nepal 147,181 28.04 1201 67.5 57.0 39
Pakistan 796,095 
166.52 2678 67.2
54.0
31
Sri Lanka 65,610 20.65 4886 74.4 91.0 23
5 Data compiled from various sources: UNDP Human Development Report 2010; Human Development in 
South Asia 2009: Trade and Human Development in South Asia. Karachi: The Mahbub ul Haq Human 
Development Centre & Oxford University Press, 2010; Website of the Asian development Bank [interactive]. 
[accessed on 20-09-2011]. <http://www.adb.org/>; CIA World Fact book [interactive]. [accessed on 20-09-
2011]. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>. 
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Table 2. Military Expenditure Database for South Asia (2001-2010) in constant US $ million (2009)6
One should, however, remember that the, “Indian self fashioning in South Asia is 
more as a hegemon in the Gramscian sense of the term, a consensual leader rather than 
as a military or an economic power intent on dominating neighbours.”7 Moreover, its 
‘hegemonic’ status has not remained uncontested or unquestioned. One author argues 
that: “Hegemonic stability requires of the major power to offer economic and security 
advantages to other countries, a task which India has not risen to. India’s ability to 
extend capital, aid, market access, and technology, in spite of their easier adaptability, 
has been severely circumscribed by its own requirements for the ambitious development 
programmes it has embarked upon, neither have other countries of the region been 
willing to grant India that role.”8
India’s South Asian neighbours have sought to counter India’s hegemony in three 
major ways: (a) by minimising economic relations with India; (b) by inviting extra-
systemic involvement; and, (c) by internationalisation of disputes with India.9
In characterising India’s South Asian policy one must, however, adopt a cautious 
approach before jumping to any quick conclusion, and more importantly, in trying 
6 Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) website [interactive]. [accessed on 27-09-2011. <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>.
7 Krishna, S. Post Colonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 28.
8 Anoop, S. S. Regional Integration in South Asia: Chasing a Chimera? Regional Studies. Islamabad: Institute 
of Regional Studies. 2000, XVIII(4): 123.
9 Basrur, R. M. India’s External Relations: A Theoretical Analysis. New Delhi: Commonwealth Pub, 2000, 
p. 91.
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Afghanistan – – 153 156 142 154 226 198 250 –
Bangladesh 841 816 818 822 833 897 944 932 1024 1137
Bhutan – – – – – – – – – –
India 22557 22487 22,989 26,679 28,196 28,365 28,765 32,106 35,819 34,816
Maldives – – – – – – – – – –
Nepal 106 141 157 187 207 194 180 188 210 207
Pakistan 4,108 4,414 4,714 4,911 5,101 5,160 5,182 4,888 5,039 5,160
Sri Lanka 1,186 981 883 983 910 1,051 1,287 1,474 1,480 1,280
Shantanu Chakrabarti. India’s Regional Policy Making in Post Cold War Setting412
to firmly place it under the rubric of any theoretical explanation. Understanding the 
complexities involved in Indian policy making requires one to remember the colonial 
legacy inherited by the new nation state restricting her attempts to initiate foreign policy 
making on a clean slate since 1947. As one scholar argues that during the Nehruvian 
period Indian foreign policy making was, at best, ambiguous.10 Much of this ambiguity 
actually arose because of the inherited legacy of colonial policy making.
2.  Evolution of India’s South Asia Policy Making: a Brief  
 Overview
Under British colonialism, there were certain attempts to project India as the major 
strategic centre of Britain’s Afro-Asian empire. Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899-1905), for 
instance, going beyond Viceroy Lord Mayo’s (1869-1872) conception of an ‘informal 
empire,’ often taking a strong line against the strategic thinking of the policymakers 
in London, highlighted his grand vision of treating India as the, “important strategic 
location with major resources and the point from which British interests in the Middle 
East, South East Asia and China could be controlled.”11 Indian foreign policy-making in 
the colonial period was mainly under the guidance and control of the British government, 
but one should remember that the Government of India’s (GOI) Foreign and Political 
Office exercised substantial control over the Asian and African affairs. Government of 
India, for instance, had its representatives called Agents or Commissioners stationed 
in Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Malaya and South Africa until 1947. 
The Indian nationalists, particularly the Indian National Congress (INC), since its 
formation in 1885, developed an ambivalent relationship with this sort of foreign policy 
projection. On the one hand, there was rejection at one level of the colonial state’s power 
projection as an ‘imperialist scheme’ which must be rejected after independence. The 
Indian National Congress, in fact, would attempt to ‘territorialise’ their conception of 
independent nation state by being critical of the colonial imperialist policies pursued in 
Asia from the Indian base. On the other hand, the assertion that India would continue 
to play a leading role in Asian affairs, if not in the world, not as a military power, but 
as a benevolent leader, continued to be expressed in nationalist thinking on foreign 
affairs. The nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s representation to the American 
president Wilson and the French president Clemenceau at the time of ongoing Versailles 
Conference after the end of the First World War, for instance, mentioned that “with her 
10 Misra, A. India at 50: Democracy Nationalism and Foreign Policy Choices. Asian Affairs. 1999, 30(1): 51.
11 Vasudevan, H.; Sarkar, A. Colonial Dominance and Indigenous Response. In: Kumar Ray, J. (ed.) History 
of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization. Vol. 10, Part 6. Aspects of India’s International 
Relations 1700-2000: South Asia and the World. New Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2007, p. 29; For further 
details on pre-colonial and colonial influences on India’s evolving strategic culture see, Vivekanandan, J. 
Interrogating International Relations: India’s Strategic Practice and the return of History. New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2011.
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vast area, enormous resources, and prodigious population she may well aspire to be a 
leading power in Asia if not in the world.”12
Re-engagement with Asia, as far possible on Indian terms, was, thus, very much a 
part of Nehru’s foreign policy agenda. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly of India on 
8th March 1949, Nehru said: “When we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of 
any ambition of hers, but because of the force of circumstances, because of geography, 
because of history and because of so many other things, inevitably has to play a very 
important part in Asia…India becomes a kind of meeting ground for various trends and 
forces and a meeting ground between what might roughly be called the East and the 
West…If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably 
comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, 
you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far East…Even if you think in terms 
of regional organizations in Asia, you have to keep in touch with the other regions. And 
whatever regions you may have in mind, the importance of India cannot be ignored.”13
Nehru’s ‘Asianism’, however, did not really have its focus upon South Asia. India, 
in fact, consciously avoided growth of multilateralism in South Asia and put more 
emphasis on bilateralism with other countries. Regional relations, particularly with 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, continued to suffer disputes over contested territories (the status 
of Jammu and Kashmir), treatment of minorities (Hindu Bengalis in East Pakistan and 
Tamils in Sri Lanka) and water sharing, in spite of various bilateral agreements being 
signed from time to time. Indian foreign policy was to develop a greater regional focus 
only under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966) who increased India’s 
engagement with South Asia. 
Regional policy pursued during the 1970s and 1980s (with a brief period of Janata 
Party government at the Centre from 1977 to 1980) under the premiership of Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi became more activist and often interventionist in nature. 
According to one analyst it was this ‘civilian militarism’ followed by both Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi beginning with the Bangladesh war (1971) and ending with 
the intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 that bolstered Indian presence in the region.14 
Certain changes were evident in the Indian regional policymaking since the 1990s. 
Such changes were a part of the shifting outlook of India’s external relations.15 The 
‘crossing of the Rubicon’ decision was largely an attempt to adjust to the shifting paradigm 
of the global order in the post Cold War period and also to the onset of the globalisation 
process. In terms of greater engagement with the South Asian neighbourhood, the clear 
articulation came from I.K.Gujaral, in his capacity as the foreign minister and later on 
the prime minister in the United Front government (1996-1998). Eponymously known 
as the Gujaral Doctrine, the policy consisted of a set of five main principles essentially 
12 Vasudevan, H.; Sarkar, A., supra note 11, p. 47.
13 Cited in Appadorai, A. (ed.) Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations: 1947-1972. Vol. 1. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 21.
14 Gupta, S. India Redefines its Role. Adelphi Paper 293. IISS, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 37.
15 For details see, Chakrabarti, S. Cooperation in South Asia: the Indian Perspective. Kolkata: KP Bagchi, 
2008, p. 12‒20.
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focussing upon India’s non-reciprocal approach towards betterment of relations with 
smaller South Asian neighbours helping in creating an atmosphere of mutual goodwill 
and trust in the region.
The ‘Gujral Doctrine’ was controversial when it was first unveiled but became the 
basis for neighbourhood policies of latter governments, cutting across political divisions. 
There seems to be a general consensus that New Delhi must act non-reciprocally towards 
its neighbours and create stakes for its neighbours in the success of India.16
3. Major Trends in the Post Cold War Period: India’s Concerns
In the post Cold War period, one could identify at least four major trends influencing 
the evolving regional dynamics. First, internationalisation of South Asian regional 
dynamics has been one major feature in the post Cold War years. While this is not new, 
the nature and the intensity of such influence has certainly increased to the level of being 
considered as a major factor. The prime regional organisation in South Asia, the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) currently has nine external 
observers: Australia, China, European Union (EU), Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea 
(South Korea), Mauritius, Myanmar, and the U.S.A. The SAARC, in recent years, has 
also sought to diversify its operations by establishing linkages (bilateral and multilateral 
basis) with external countries or organisations particularly located in Southeast Asia and 
East Asia.
Direct involvement of external agencies at bilateral level has also markedly increased 
in South Asia. The US and the NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan along with other 
external players have made the Afghan theatre truly global since 2001. Amidst all talks 
within policy making circles about an imminent US withdrawal from the country, the US 
Vice President Joe Biden, while on a visit in Afghanistan in January 2011 commented, 
“If the Afghan people want it, we (United States) won’t leave in 2014.”17 
The US engagement with Pakistan has also continued in spite of it generating 
significant backlash in the country. According to the results of an opinion poll conducted 
by the Pew Global Initiative, just 12% express a positive view of the U.S with most 
Pakistanis viewing the U.S. as an enemy, considering it a potential military threat, 
and oppose American-led anti-terrorism efforts.18 In a recent statement the Chairman 
of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen said that the Pakistan’s spy agency, 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), directly supported and abetted the Haqqani network 
of militants in North Waziristan. In a report to Congress in April 2011, the Obama 
16 Mohan, R. C. The Making of Indian Foreign Policy: The Role of Scholarship and Public Opinion. ISAS 
Working Paper No. 73. Institute of South Asian Studies, University of Singapore. 13th July 2009, p. 12.
17 Partlow, J. Biden: U.S. would support Afghans beyond 2014 target. The Washington Post. 11th January 
2011 [interactive]. [accessed on 15-01-2011]. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/10/AR2011011002389.html?sid=ST2011011303015>.
18 ‘U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden Killing’. Pew Global Attitudes Project. 
Pew Research Center [interactive]. [accessed on 02-10-2011]. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/21/u-s-
image-in-pakistan-falls-no-further-following-bin-laden-killing/>.
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administration had complained that the Pakistani Army had “no clear path” toward 
defeating the insurgency inside Pakistan.19 Popular demonstrations in Pakistan on 23rd 
April 2011 halted NATO supply shipments to Afghanistan on Saturday after thousands 
of protesters rallied on the main road to the border to demand Washington stop firing 
missiles against militants sheltering in the country. In September 2010, Pakistan had 
closed the Afghan border for 20 days to protest a NATO helicopter strike inside its 
borders. In spite of these hiccups, the US engagement is going to continue because of 
the strategic importance of Pakistan. 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, witnessed the involvement of Norway and some other 
European countries in the attempted peace process between the government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the period of civil war. Currently, 
however, the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the criticisms from several 
European countries regarding the government’s poor human rights records have led to 
deterioration of relations with the western countries. 
Nepal, which also witnessed external involvement during the peace process with 
the Maoists, also seems to be getting increasingly wary of such influences. Analysts 
have become critical of Nepal’s over-dependence on foreign powers on the question of 
economic assistance over a period of time, and her foreign as well as domestic policies 
being largely influenced by external considerations. 
Interesting to note that while the South Asian countries are becoming increasingly 
wary of western influence, there has been relative silence on the considerable 
enhancement of the Chinese influence in the region. In 2007, for instance, since the 
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse visited Beijing to pave the way for a massive 
programme of soft loans and some military assistance, Chinese influence has continued 
to grow steadily in that country. Chinese military help proved to be crucial for the Sri 
Lankan forces finally managing to crush the LTTE insurgency. The most talked about 
Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka is of course the upcoming Hambantota Complex in 
the home district of President. The Hambantota complex with its deep sea port, its own 
international airport at Weerawila, its own oil storage facilities and refinery, its own 
tourist hub, its own international conference hall and its own sports stadium, would 
be a state of the art project when completed. Chinese help has also been provided for 
the construction of the coal power plant at Norochcholai the first phase of which was 
completed recently and the work on second phase has started. 
Similar to Sri Lanka, since 2002, China has pledged nearly $1 billion in aid to 
Afghanistan. In 2008, a state-owned Chinese firm provided the largest single foreign 
direct investment in Afghanistan amounting nearly $3.5 billion to develop the Aynak 
copper field in Logar province. China remains in the running to develop the Hajigak 
iron ore deposit in Bamiyan province, west of Kabul. Recent bilateral agreements 
have focussed on expanding economic cooperation, ensuring favorable tariffs on 
Afghan exports, and creating scholarships for technical training programs across a 
19 Perlez, J.; Khan, I. Deadly Drone Strike by U.S. may fuel anger in Pakistan. New York Times. 22nd April 
2011 [interactive]. [accessed on 24-04-2011]. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23pakistan.
html?scp=2&sq=pakistan&st=cse>.
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range of critical fields: commerce, communications, education, health, economics, and 
counternarcotics. China has also made some very limited contributions to the training 
of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In 2009, China also conducted a mine-
clearing training course for officers from the ANSF.
Considering the fact that China formally established ties with Bangladesh only in 
1975, the growth in partnership has been relatively steady and smooth. China is currently 
Bangladesh’s biggest trade partner and one of the leading investor in infrastructure 
projects. China is also the largest and most important provider of military hardware and 
training to the latter’s armed forces.
Chinese engagement with Nepal has also continued to grow during this period in 
spite of concerns showed by India. The Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Chief Chen 
Bingde, in fact, while on a recent visit to Nepal, said that, “Involvement of third party in 
bilateral aspects of Nepal-China relations will not be acceptable to China.”20
The second important development has been the rising importance of the South 
Asian diaspora in regional foreign policy making. The South Asian diaspora numbers 
around thirty million people worldwide. Prior to the Second World War they were mostly 
located in Southeast Asia, South and East Africa, the Caribbean, Mauritius and Fiji. In 
the post 1945 period, there has been rapid escalation in the numbers settling down in 
the Western world and in West Asia.21 This phenomenal growth, alongside recognition 
of the global economic, political and social significance of the South Asian diaspora, 
has enhanced its importance in the policymaking circles of the South Asian countries. 
This has been helped by the fact that given the developments in communications, the 
more recent migrations have given a degree of ‘connectedness’ between the diaspora 
and the homeland quite unthinkable even a few years ago. One indication of this is the 
creation of separate ministries dedicated to the diaspora and foreign migrant workers in 
most countries in South Asia. The Bangladesh Government established the ministry of 
Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment in 2001. The Indian government created 
the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004. Originally established in May 
2004 as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs, it was renamed as the Ministry 
of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004. The Sri Lankan government 
created the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion & Welfare (MFEPW) in 2007. 
The Pakistan government established the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis in 2008. South 
Asian diaspora also seems to be taking greater interest and more initiatives in matters 
related to the region. 
The third major factor has been increasing regionalisation of India’s South Asian 
policy making. The new forces shaping public opinion and influencing foreign policy 
are not limited to the national theatre. There is no doubt that different regions of India 
had always had some influence on the nation’s foreign policy towards some of the 
20 Source: Third Party involvement in Nepal-China relation unacceptable: PLA Chief [intercative]. [accessed 
on 24-02-2011]. <http://www.telegraphnepal.com/headline/2011-03-25/third-party-involvement-in-nepal-
china-relation-unacceptable:-pla-chief>.
21 Rai, R.; Reeves, P. ‘Introduction’. In: Rai, R.; Reeves, P. (eds.) The South Asian Diaspora: Transnational 
Networks and changing Identities. USA: Routledge, 2009, p. 2.
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neighbouring and ethnically kindred countries. The influence of Tamil Nadu politics 
on India’s policy towards Sri Lanka is well known. Equally significant has been the 
considerable influence exercised by the elite groups in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 
having political influence and often enjoying connections and family ties with elite 
families in Nepal, on New Delhi’s ties with Nepal.22 Non-official close interactions 
between communities in West Bengal and Bangladesh also fall within this category. To 
an extent, this has been because of the fact that there is continuous spill over of internal 
and domestic issues because of intra-regional linkages in terms of ethnic and religious 
connections cutting across the state borders.
In South Asia, it has also been argued, that geopolitics has to be seen as not simply 
occurring in a disconnected fashion at the international level, but rather as influencing 
and creating deeper social and political structures and orientations within states.23 South 
Asia is fertile ground for geopolitical influence in the domestic sphere with contested 
sovereignties; ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities spilling across borders; and 
insecure political classes. The geopolitical interests and needs of regional and extra-
regional states have increasingly had a deep impact on the shaping process of internal 
identities leading to internal conflicts of various types. Religious extremism and terrorism 
is the most easily identified connection. Extremism Leftist movements have also tended 
to spill over and develop intra-regional linkages.
The fourth major factor has been the increasing premium that is being accorded to the 
process of strengthening economic relations as a vital element in foreign policy making. 
Nehru, in fact, had once himself commented in the Indian Parliament that foreign policy 
is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic 
policies, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and rather groping.24 
But the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) involvement with the process of 
economic diplomacy remained somewhat limited before the onset of liberalisation in 
1991.25 
But this policy has not really been South Asia centric. The prime regional 
organisation the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) is yet 
to make any substantial impact even after 26 years since its creation. In spite of the 
introduction of trade liberalisation schemes like the SAPTA (SAARC Preferential 
Trading Arrangement, 1995) and SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Area, 2004), the level 
of intra-regional trade continues to remain low, hovering between 4 and 6 percent only 
(see Table 3 below).
22 Mohan, R. C., supra note 16, p. 9.
23 Ollapally, D. M. The Politics of Extremism in South Asia. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 3.
24 Chakrabarti, R. The Political Economy of India’s Foreign Policy. Calcutta: K.P Bagchi & Co, 1982, p. 18.
25 Sridharan, K. Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian 
Experience. Diplomacy & Statecraft. 2002, 13(2): 62‒68.
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Table 3. SAARC Intra-Regional Trade (% age of global trade)26
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
5.37 5.24 6.20 5.80 6.02 5.13 5.21 4.33 4.20 4.31
One of the major causes of poor intra-regional trade in South Asia is because of 
India’s low key involvement (see Table 4 below). India in fact, prefers to have bilateral 
trade agreements with her South Asian neighbours and already enjoys free trade 
agreements with South Asian neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. Initiatives 
to bolster South Asian economic integration, thus, continue to remain mostly confined to 
policy brief/papers and expert committee recommendations rather than getting translated 
into action.
Table 4. India’s Trade with Saarc Countries (2009-2010) (In $ Million)27
Country Export from 
India
Import to India Total Volume 
of Bilateral 
Trade
India’s Total 
Trade
% age share 
Afghanistan 463.55 125.19 588.74 467124.31 0.13
Bangladesh 2433.77 254.66 2,688.44 467,124.31 0.58
Bhutan 118.86 153.11 271.98 467,124.31 0.06
Maldives 79.86 3.63 83.49 467,124.31 0.02
Nepal 1,533.31 452.61 1,985.93 467,124.31 0.43
Pakistan 1,573.32 275.94 1,849.26 467,124.31 0.40
Sri Lanka 2,188.01 392.19 2,580.20 467,124.31 0.55
Within Asia, India’s major economic initiatives are mainly directed through the 
‘Look East Policy’ which seeks to expand India’s links with the countries located in 
Southeast Asia and East Asia along with her burgeoning influence in the Asia-Pacific 
and Indian Ocean zones. Joint economic initiatives involving South Asian countries 
like the South Asian sub-regional grouping, the Kunming Initiative, the BIMSTEC 
(Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), the 
26 Data compiled from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks.
27 Export Import Data Bank, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India website [interactive]. [accessed on 
28-09-2011]. <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecntq.asp>. 
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Mekong- Ganga Cooperation, the BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) Economic 
Cooperation, the I0R-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation) 
are mostly attempts to create extra-regional economic linkages between South Asia and 
Southeast Asia and East Asian countries rather than enhancing regional cooperation 
within South Asia specifically. Much more vigorous regional economic initiatives are, 
however, required as poverty and underdevelopment continues to affect large sections 
of the regional population which require intensive regional collaboration. Indian soft 
power approach could play a decisive role in this regard.
4. Human Security Concerns in South Asia
Chronic poverty and underdevelopment continues to be the most obvious and 
pernicious threat to human security in the region. With 20 per cent of the world 
population and constituting only about 5 per cent of the world area and that too with 
high rate of density, teeming millions in the region continue to wallow in poverty 
and destitution, which in turn gives rise to numerous socio-political ills. The need for 
enhancement of regional human security is particularly being felt in the context of the 
region recently experiencing the process of globalisation. The process of globalisation 
has resulted in greater unevenness mainly benefiting the developed world, while in the 
developing world; the benefits have accrued only to a few developing countries. Even 
in the developing countries enjoying the benefits of globalisation such impact have not 
necessarily been felt across the spectrum. The process of undertaking globalisation has 
involved a combination of structural changes and shifting emphasis from the state to 
the market with the objective of closer interaction and interconnection between the 
domestic and the global economy. This, however, has also not been a case of unmixed 
blessing. Moreover, large sections of the already impoverished population have found 
themselves, most often, at the receiving end of such policies. Large sections of the 
already impoverished population have found themselves, most often, at the receiving 
end of such policies. Thus, in spite of experiencing economic growth, South Asia, 
continues to be one of world’s most underdeveloped regions.
Environmental/ecological security issues, particularly associated with the lopsided 
development projects, have become another major paradigm within the field of Non-
traditional Security in recent years. According to the UNHCR World’s State of the 
Refugees Report of 1993, environmental degradation was identified as one of the four 
major causes of refugee flow along with political instability, economic tensions, and 
ethnic conflict. It has been argued, for instance, that severe environmental scarcities 
often contribute to major civil violence. Poor countries are particularly vulnerable to this 
violence, because larger fractions of their populations depend for their daily livelihoods 
on local renewable resources. In the case of South Asia, for instance, it has been argued: 
“Environmental-induced conflicts are not independent and isolated occurrences but 
instead are part of broader regional conflicts based on territorial dispute, cross-border 
migration, differing security perception and ethnic and religious animosity in which 
Shantanu Chakrabarti. India’s Regional Policy Making in Post Cold War Setting420
environmental issues can become additional sources of sub-national or inter-state 
conflict.”28 
Haphazard and unrestricted industrialisation programmes along with indiscriminate 
destruction of the regional fund resource base has generated an environment crisis 
situation in South Asia, which turn has threatened the livelihood of millions. In the 
agricultural sector, for instance, still the major source of livelihood and occupation for 
the majority, environmental degradation has become a major concern. Recent estimates 
indicate that in South Asia, 42 per cent of the land is affected by one or other factors that 
cause land degradation. Half of the region’s dry lands face the threat of desertification, 
with as much as 63 million hectares of rain fed cropland and 16 million hectares of 
irrigated land having been lost due to it, especially in India and Pakistan. Among other 
countries, it is estimated that nearly one-third of the land in Sri Lanka has been subjected 
to soil erosion. One-fourth of Pakistan’s total land area is facing serious threats of water 
and wind erosion. In parts of Bangladesh and northern India, soils have become acidified 
and salinised. The steep terrain of Nepal is susceptible to soil erosion and landslides. 
As per Global Assessment of Soil Degradation (GLASOD) estimates, 6 per cent of 
Afghanistan’s land is very severely affected and 10 per cent is severely affected due to 
anthropogenic activities.29 
5. Constructing an Alternative Regional Agenda in South Asia?
Given the rising levels of traditional and non-traditional security concerns (and 
merger of the two), alternative visions, advocating more holistic pattern of development, 
are being offered from certain quarters, some of which are receiving official sanctions 
and elite level endorsement. In the region of South Asia, one alternative vision has been 
offered by Bhutan through its official endorsement of the concept of ‘Gross National 
Happiness.’ In spite of problems involved in its process of implementation, theoretically 
the concept of ‘Gross National Happiness.’ is measured by the peoples’ sense of being 
well-governed, their relationship with the environment, satisfaction with the pace of 
economic development and a sense of cultural and national belonging. In this connection, 
greater focus on evolving a common and cooperative human security oriented foreign 
policy agenda through consensus building could be one positive development. Recent 
attempt to project an alternative security problematique in Southeast Asia through 
regional consensus building efforts to ‘Asianise’ the paradigm of human security in 
order to make it more appropriate for regional application, could perhaps be emulated in 
South Asia in this regard. 30
28 Sinha, U. K. Environmental Stresses and their Security Implications for South Asia. Strategic Analysis. 
2006, 30(3): 613.
29 South Asia Environment Outlook 2009. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009, p. 13.
30 Sucharithanarugse, W. The Concept of “Human Security” extended: “Asianizing the Paradigm”. In: 
Tow, W. T.; Thakur, R.; Hyun, I. (eds.) Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Hu-
man Security. New York: United Nations University, 2000, p. 49‒61.
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Is it possible for India to construct a regional foreign policy agenda on the basis 
of a human security paradigm? The most unique feature of this new concept is its 
incorporation of socio-economic development within a framework of security discourse, 
thereby making both concepts more holistic and acceptable to the South Asian 
community. Human security has emerged as a political leitmotif or guiding vision for 
policy framing in many nation-states trying to evolve their foreign policy agendas which 
would be more suitable in grappling with myriad security related issues in the post Cold 
War world. It has been argued that in order to emerge as a successful guiding vision, a 
political leitmotif requires to fulfil three functions: (a) explanation and orientation; (b) 
coordination and action related decision guidance; and (c) motivation and mobilisation.31 
Developing a specific human security agenda as a part of a country’s foreign policy 
goal, fit to be implemented, however, continues to be a difficult task. The projection 
of human security as ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ is perfect as an 
ideal to be achieved but is too abstract as a policy to be implemented, particularly 
by nation-states in their capacity as international actors. One country that has taken 
much initiative, especially since the 1990s, to evolve a human security oriented foreign 
policy agenda is Canada. Apart from such significant steps including the signing of 
the Lysoen Agreement with Norway in 1998 with its emphasis on enhancing human 
security, promoting human rights, strengthening humanitarian law, preventing conflict 
and fostering democracy and good governance, Canada also made pioneering efforts 
to set up the Human Security Network (HSN) in 1999. In the Asian context, Thailand 
from Southeast Asia is a member of this network. Japan, in particular, has also been 
particularly successful within Asia in adopting a human security oriented foreign policy. 
There have, however, been exceptions. The debate on human security is relatively 
new to Asia in spite of the historical heritage of traditional pre-colonial philosophies 
concerned with statecraft highlighting the importance of state sponsored welfare 
activities. As most nation-states within the region have emerged as independent entities 
after decolonisation since the end of the Second World War, and are still struggling 
with the process of nation building, state- centric security paradigm still continue to 
be dominant in the foreign policy formulations of the governing elites. Multilateral 
and normative concepts of security have not yet found much resonance in South Asian 
countries within the respective decision making circles.
The possibilities of India developing a foreign policy agenda based on its 
conceptualisation and interpretation of human security would therefore involve much 
difficulties. New developments since the end of the Cold War and globalisation related 
inter-linkages, have, however, generated fresh opportunities for India to come out of the 
state centric straitjacket mentality and give more scope to consensual and multilateral 
dimensions of foreign policy framing. At the global level also Indian bilateral and 
31 Werthes, S.; Debiel, T. Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Introduction to Changes, Concepts and 
Cases. Debielm T.; Werthes, S. (eds.) Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and 
Cases. INEF Report 80/2006. Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006, 
p. 12‒13.
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multilateral engagements, which have become much extended in recent years, also 
continue to focus on peaceful and consensual approach towards various issues. Though 
Indian foreign policy making process does not yet specifically use human security as a 
defining goal, much of the issues it is concerned with do fall within the agenda of human 
security. Whether the Indian policy makers would be willing to take up the challenge or 
display enough dexterity in implementing it, however, remains doubtful. 
Conclusions
South Asian regional dynamics, thus, continue to evolve facing old as well as fresh 
challenges without much stability. This, however, does not mean that the regional has 
remained trapped within a conflict prone set-up. The year 2008, for instance, witnessed 
a spate of democratisation in South Asia. In February 2008, Pakistan reverted to 
civilian rule. In the same year, Bhutan formally established a democratic government. 
In 2008, elections were also held successfully in Nepal for the constituent Assembly 
after years of political turmoil and Maldives also ushered in multi-party democracy.32 
Democratisation, however, has not proven to be a panacea for all problems. Democracies, 
sadly, do go to war against each other and could have tension-filled relations. Internal 
security related problems and external threats continue to plague India as well as her 
South Asian neighbours to a greater or lesser degree. India’s regional policy, in this 
connection, continues to be largely state-centric, oriented towards maintenance and 
heightening of traditional security which often runs contradictory to the policy options 
of her neighbouring countries. As one analyst argues: “First, India’s policymakers have 
not been able to articulate an alternative grand strategy for the country to replace its prior 
commitment to nonalignment. A country that hopes to play a major role in global affairs 
cannot be so bereft of ideas to guide its foreign policy. In effect, India’s policymakers 
need to spell out a new vision of a global order barring a vague preference for multi-
polarity.”33
The terms of engagement, however, continue to change and evolve. It has been 
argued, for instance, that, in recent years, the Indian policymakers, “seek to marry 
normative goals and behaviour to policies furthering the national interest, broadly 
defined as extending from traditional to human security for its citizens.”34 In doing 
this, one option could be the greater use of the substantial non-government, multi-track 
diplomatic and business networks which already exist within the region. The adoption 
of a human security-oriented foreign policy agenda is another option for the Indian 
policymakers to consider. Without such alterations within the policy making structure, it 
32 Behuria, A. K. Preface. South Asia: The Quest for Regional Cooperation. New Delhi: Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses, 2009, p. ii.
33 Ganguly, S. Structure and Agency in the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. ISAS Working Paper, No. 116. 
21, November 2010, p. 11.
34 Kumar, R. India as a Foreign Policy Actor - Normative Redux. CEPS Working Document No. 285. Centre 
for European Policy Studies(CEPS). February 2008, p. 26.
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INDIJOS REGIONINĖ POLITIKA PO ŠALTOJO KARO
Shantanu Chakrabarti
Kalkutos universitetas, Indija
Santrauka. Indijos siekis užimti „stiprios jėgos“ poziciją, ypač po Šaltojo karo, išplėtė 
jos globalius įsipareigojimus ir atsakomybę. Tačiau jos globalų statusą labiausiai formuoja 
strategiškai svarbi Pietų Azijos, kuri vis dar išgyvena istoriškai susiklosčiusius santykius ir jų 
padarinius, kaimynystė. Dėl Indijos geostrateginio dominavimo šiame regione Pietų Azija 
tradiciškai vadinamas „Indo-centriniu“ regionu. Tačiau kaimyninės Pietų Azijos valstybės 
toli gražu nelinkusios dėl šio fakto vienareikšmiškai pripažinti Indijos „hegemonijos“. Indi-
jos regioninės hegemonijos formavimas ir realizavimas – sudėtingas procesas, dėl jos dažnai 
konkuruojama. Apibūdinant regioninę Indijos politiką negalima daryti skubotų išvadų, ypač 
bandant taikyti jai kokį nors teorinį modelį. Siekiant suprasti Indijos politikos struktūrą ir 
jos niuansus būtina prisiminti, jog nauja valstybė paveldėjo kolonijinę praeitį ir iki 1947 m. 
negalėjo formuoti naujos užsienio politikos, taip pat daugybę problemų, su kuriomis kuriama 
valstybė susidūrė po dekolonizacijos. Užuot bandžiusi užimti pagrindines pozicijas regione, 
Indija Pietų Azijoje laikėsi status quo politikos ir iš esmės konservatyviai susitelkė į tradicinę 
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diplomatiją, o ne į galingą savo švelniųjų gebėjimų potencialą. Reikšmingai politikos proceso 
kaitai būtinos rimtos nestandartinės idėjos ir vizijos. Tai pirmiausia turėtų būti nevyriausy-
binės iniciatyvos ir, jei tai bus įgyvendintina, regioninė politika turėtų orientuotis į žmonių 
saugumą. Alternatyvios politikos vykdymas gali sukelti esminius status quo pokyčius šiame 
regione.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Indija, Pietų Azija, regionalizmas, strategija, saugumas, diplo-
matija.
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